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Abstract
This paper uses a representative sample of individuals on France's main
welfare program (the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI) to estimate
monetary incentives for employment among welfare recipients. Based on
the estimated joint distribution of wages and hours potentially oﬀered to
each individual, we compute potential gains from working in a very detailed
manner. Relating these gains to observed employment, we then estimate a
simple structural labor supply model. We ﬁnd that potential gains are al-
most always positive but very small on average, especially for single mothers,
because of the high implicit marginal tax rates embedded in the system. Em-
ployment rates are sensitive to incentives with extensive margin elasticities
for both men and women usually below one. Conditional on these elastici-
ties, simulations indicate that existing policies devoted to reducing marginal
tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution, such as the intéressement
earnings top-up program, have little impact in this population due to their
very limited scope. The recently introduced negative income tax (Prime
pour l'emploi), seems to be an exception.
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1 Introduction
Much of the debate surrounding the question of Making Work Pay (OECD,
2003) turns on two questions: a) how much additional disposable income
would an individual or household gain by moving from welfare to work and
b) what is the elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin with respect
to the monetary gain (or loss) in disposable income that a household would
experience by shifting from welfare to work. The vast majority of empiri-
cal studies have focused on the North American (and the United States in
particular) labor markets (Moﬃtt, 2002), while it seems clear, in a prima
facie sense, that an analysis of the policy of a guaranteed minimum income
is likely to be more relevant for European countries, as the level and ubiquity
of these policies is much more important on the eastern shore of the Atlantic.
This paper provides contributions along these two dimensions while adopt-
ing a methodological approach that treats job oﬀers as wage-hours pairs
rather than simple wage oﬀers for which the individual can choose hours
freely. This approach has been adopted by many authors in the past1 and
seems particularly appropriate when modeling labor supply in France, the
country upon which the empirical analysis in this paper is based. In particu-
lar, the empirical distribution of hours worked tends to be bimodal (including
for men in our sample) largely as a result of the numerous institutional con-
straints that concern weekly hours.
In this context, we provide a model of labor supply in the presence of
individual-speciﬁc wage-hours job oﬀers that we take to data on a represen-
tative sample of welfare recipients in France in December 1996. We focus
on recipients of France's guaranteed minimum income program (the Revenu
Minimum d'Insertion, or RMI ) which is central in the country's welfare poli-
cies: more than 1 million households receive payments from the RMI system,
covering approximately 3% of the population. Among welfare beneﬁciaries,
these people are in a position to work (in contrast with the handicapped or
the elderly on speciﬁc welfare programs), and at the same time face high im-
plicit marginal tax rates. This population is thus a major target for policies
aimed at making work pay. It must be acknowledged that, except for low
wage workers very close to RMI eligibility, our results either in terms of job
oﬀer distributions, implicit taxes on labour earnings or working behavior,
may not by extended to a larger population potentially exposed to falling
into welfare. Nevertheless, this analysis requires very detailed data in order
to compute disposable income in a complex setting and such data is not
available for a wide range of the population although it is available for the
RMI recipient population covered by the survey we use.
On the whole, we see the contribution of this paper to the literature
1See, for example, Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992), Kahn and Lang (1991, 1996),
Dickens and Lundberg (1993), Stewart and Swaﬃeld (1997), Euwals and van Soest (1999),
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Laroque and Salanié (2003).
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as four-fold. First, we develop a theoretical model in which job oﬀers are
individual speciﬁc wage and hours combinations that we estimate for wel-
fare recipients in a parametric but very ﬂexible manner, that encompasses
many institutional settings and ﬁts the data very closely. Second, through
a detailed modeling of France's tax and transfer system, we identify impor-
tant discontinuities and conditionalities in the function that translates net
(of payroll tax) earnings into disposable income and we quantify its impact
on work incentives. Third, we estimate a simple structural labor supply
model that accommodates many important aspects of France's labor mar-
ket. Identiﬁcation of this model relies on exclusion restrictions in the vectors
of determinants of the job oﬀer distribution and the utility function (as is
typically the case in this literature) and on exploitation of the particularities
of France's tax and transfer rules. Finally, we simulate several alternative
policy settings, including policies that were implemented in France several
years after the data were collected, in order to better evaluate the anticipated
labor supply response to diﬀerent sorts of reforms.
Our estimation of the job oﬀer distribution and our calculations of dis-
posable income in the case of work or welfare suggest that the monetary gain
in household income when accepting a typical job oﬀer is positive, but often
quite small with half the population of welfare recipients experiencing at
most a 21% increase in disposable income relative to their disposable income
on welfare. These small gains to employment seem driven in large part by
hours constraints, in that many welfare recipients can not expect to receive
a full-time job oﬀer. There is substantial variation in gains to employment
across household types, with childless single-person households experiencing
the largest gains (median gains of 32%) and couples with at least 2 children
experiencing much lower gains (median of 11%). A time-limited earnings
top-up program (intéressement) is oﬀered to welfare recipients with the ob-
jective of increasing the monetary gain to employment, however we ﬁnd that
the associated increase is only marginal, due to the limited scope of this
program.
Our simulation studies suggest that the elasticity of labor supply at the
extensive margin is quite comparable to levels found in the United States
and French literature on welfare recipients, with estimates for single men
ranging from 1.25 to 0.39 and for single women from 1.10 to 0.44 (depending
on the speciﬁcation). In addition, although we ﬁnd that the main earnings
top-up program does not seem to have the ability to induce large changes in
labor supply, certain other policy reforms (such as the Prime Pour l'Emploi
negative income tax adopted in 2001) may help accelerate the transition into
employment among welfare recipients.
Although there are other studies of the eﬀects of welfare receipt on labor
supply in France,2 perhaps the closest work to ours comes from Laroque
2See, for example, Gravel et. al. (2004), Gurgand and Margolis (2001), Hagneré et.
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and Salanié (2002). They examine the impact of incentives on labor supply
considering the whole ﬁscal system and total French population. Laroque
and Salanié (2003) expands upon Laroque and Salanié (2002) by introducing
female part-time work and indirectly integrating the wage-hours pairs that
we explicitly model, a dimension neglected from their ﬁrst paper. In this
work, we analyse more carefully the welfare population. In particular, they
have incomplete information on household income and do not consider the
time-limited welfare earnings top-up program (intéressement). Furthermore,
neither of the Laroque and Salanié papers explicitly models the main public
employment program (Contrat Emploi Solidarité, or CES ). This program
accounts for one third of all jobs held by welfare recipients a year after their
being sampled and imposes very speciﬁc rules on wages, hours and payments
under the intéressement earnings top-up program.
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2, a
brief account of the French welfare system is presented with an emphasis on
the RMI. In section 3 we lay out a model and the econometric techniques
employed for estimating potential labor market earnings conditional on ob-
servable characteristics. Section 4 discusses the results of estimating the job
oﬀer distributions, while section 5 describes the distribution of the size of the
monetary incentives implied by the estimates in section 4. Section 6 consid-
ers the link between the gains to employment and the observed probability
of employment, while section 7 concludes.
2 Welfare Income in France
Since some of our identiﬁcation depends upon exploiting discontinuities and
conditionalities in the French tax and transfer system, we begin with a
schematic description of the functioning of France's guaranteed minimum
income, the Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI).3 Call sRMI the guaran-
teed minimum income threshold and T (w) the net transfers available to a
household with labor income w. In the absence of any further incentives, the
household beneﬁts from the RMI scheme when w + T (w) < sRMI , in which
case its guaranteed disposable income is set to sRMI . Otherwise, its income
is w+ T (w). As such, the RMI generates a 100% implicit marginal tax rate
on earnings such that household income is below the RMI threshold.
The intéressement earnings top-up program, which is designed to increase
work incentives, reduces this rate to 50% and extends the range of eligible
earnings. But this is only temporary and lasts for the ﬁrst 750 hours worked.4
When this entitlement to intéressement is exhausted, the household faces the
at. (2003) and Hagneré and Trannoy (2001).
3Appendix A provides more detail on the welfare system and the elements on which
we focus in our income simulations.
4The 750 hour limit was relevant in 1998, the period covered by our data. Since then,
the time limit has been extended.
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100% implicit tax rate on earnings below the RMI threshold and the general
income tax system for earnings above this level.5
Among the housing-based beneﬁts, households who rent their lodging (or
own it and are paying interest) are eligible for subsidies that apply diﬀerently
to the private and public sector housing.6 They depend on taxable income at
a decreasing marginal rate, which varies with family composition and on the
amount of the rent, and are subject to diﬀerent thresholds based on the zone
of habitation.7 In the typical situation, when taxable income is zero and the
rent is below the threshold, the subsidy covers up to 90% of the rent. All
of these transfers are included in the household resources when calculating
eligibility for the RMI.
This complex system gives rise to a characteristic proﬁle for the RMI
beneﬁciaries eﬀective marginal tax rate on labor income. Figure 1 depicts
monthly earned labor income versus disposable income for two typical situa-
tions using the rules in eﬀect in July 1998. For a single person that does not
receive the housing subsidy, the guaranteed income is 325 euros (less than
half of earnings from a month long full-time job at the minimum wage). If
not entitled to intéressement, earnings are taxed at 100% up to 325 euros.
For earnings beyond this amount, labor income is taxed at a marginal rate of
0% then 8% after 450 euros and 17% starting at earnings of approximately
900 euros. Because RMI recipients are not subject to an income tax, but
become so as soon as they leave the program, their marginal tax rate is lo-
cally inﬁnity (at 325 euros in the single person example). This decrease in
disposable income is even more pronounced for those eligible for a housing
subsidy.8
Insert Figure 1 Around Here
The budget set under intéressement is also presented on ﬁgure 1. The
marginal rate is reduced to 50% and RMI eligibility is extended up to earn-
ings of 650 euros. After 750 hours, the budget set drops down to the bottom
line. Naturally, under this scheme, the eﬀect of taxation and housing beneﬁt
loss after 650 euros is more pronounced under intéressement, as illustrated
in the ﬁgure. Under intéressement there is much more incentive to take
a 650 euros than, say, a 660 euros job. Such a shift of incentives toward
lower wages (or, equivalently, part-time work) is a shared feature of negative
income tax schedules (Moﬃtt, 2003; Saez, 2002).
At the other end of the spectrum, consider a couple with 3 children, one
5This scheme is complicated by several rules that allow the hours counter to be reset to
zero when additional transitions to and from employment take place. We do not consider
these complications here.
6Allocation logement and Aide personalisée au logement.
7The taxable income considered is that of the previous year, something that we do
not explicitly take into account in the simulations. As we use the current income, or
expected income, for the calculation of tax rates, this is equivalent to imposing a form of
stationarity in the income process.
8This inconsistency has been corrected in recent legislation.
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below 3, which receives a housing subsidy (ﬁgure 1 again). The program
parameters are diﬀerent due to the additional household members (with an
extra bonus for the third child). Incentives are even lower for this family:
the 100% marginal tax rate extends to higher earnings (up to 538 euros) and
the discontinuities are stronger as the marginal eﬀective tax rate drops to
about 20% on average until labor income reaches 2150 euros. This extended
range of relatively high marginal eﬀective tax rates is due to the importance
of means tested family-related transfers for this type of household.
These examples demonstrate how the French welfare system imposes very
high eﬀective marginal tax rates on labor income, up to 100% (and locally
inﬁnity) over a large range of labor earnings, largely due to the accumulation
of means-tested transfer schemes.9 This point has often been noted in the
literature (e.g. Laroque and Salanié (1999), among others). In this context,
the presence of intéressement has the potential to have some impact on
incentives and behavior. Although the entire proﬁle of the marginal tax rate
is of interest, certain ranges of ﬁgure 1 may be more relevant than others
for a given household when the jobs proposed by potential employers in the
form of wage-hours pairs tend to be disproportionately situated in particular
intervals on the labor earnings axis. A key element of this paper is to identify
the points that are relevant to the actual beneﬁciaries of RMI, and compare
those potential incomes with their resources on welfare.
2.1 Realized Outcomes of the RMI Recipient Population
Before considering potential gains to employment for the RMI recipient pop-
ulation, it is useful to analyze the realized outcomes for those actually em-
ployed at a point in time. Of the initial December 1996 sample, one-third are
employed a year later, only 10% of whom are in self-employment. Among
those in employment, 33% are employed under the CES public employment
program. As shown in the appendix tables, the status with respect to the
labor market is very similar for men and women in this population.
Figures 2a and 2b report observed monthly earnings (wage rate times
hours worked, gross of any transfers). They make clear that the earnings of
RMI recipients, once reemployed, are low and concentrated around the half-
time and full-time minimum wage. The strong bimodal distribution is very
unusual for the male population. It is also clear that active labor market
policy, in the form of CES jobs, plays an important role in this phenomenon.
This reinforces the justiﬁcation for the speciﬁcation described in section 3.2
and appendix B. It also suggests that the gains to employment might be
cyclically sensitive as well as dependent on the attitude of policy makers
9L'Horty and Anne (2002), using a number of case studies, have shown that additional
programs independently implemented by local governments, when they exist, tend to
increase further the marginal tax rates. Due to the lack of exhaustive data on these
local-level programs, they are not considered in this paper.
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toward active labor market policy.
Insert Figures 2a and 2B Around Here
3 The Model Framework
In order to estimate the size of the diﬀerential between labor market earn-
ings and the RMI, and the resulting impacts on labor supply, we need to
be able to impute relevant wages and working hours for those individuals
who receive the RMI. This implies the estimation of a model for the joint
distribution of potential wage and hours combinations that are oﬀered to
individuals with a given set of observable characteristics, based on data on
the observed earnings of a selected population. The hypothesis that hours
are not freely chosen at a given wage rate has been empirically supported by
Galtier (1999), although France is not an isolated case among OECD coun-
tries along this dimension (see OECD, 1995, chapter 2). Furthermore, the
structure of French payroll taxes on low earners (Remy, 2005) encourages
ﬁrms to oﬀer part-time jobs and penalizes overtime. Indeed, Roux (2005)
ﬁnds results consistent with the idea that French ﬁrms respond to such tax
incentives by varying the share and types of part-time jobs they propose.
Finally, this approach can also be justiﬁed by the importance of certain
sorts of employment promotion contracts, notably the CES (Contrat Emploi
Solidarité), that specify particular wage-hours combinations.
We make individual draws in the wage-hours distribution (unconditional
on observed employment status) to form the distribution of their potential
labor incomes and compare it with welfare. We then relate the resulting
labor supply incentives to observed employment status, via a simple static
behavioral equation.
The huge discontinuities illustrated in ﬁgure 1 would generate ill-behaved
likelihood functions if earnings and labor supply equations were to be esti-
mated jointly. Indeed, a marginal change in the wage distribution parame-
ters, for instance, can create a discontinuity in the employment probability.
Laroque and Salanié (2002) suggest smoothing the disposable income func-
tion, but this is not realistic in our context given the large steps produced by
intéressement. Furthermore, such smoothing can remove a potential source
of non-parametric identiﬁcation for the the labor supply model. We thus
proceed sequentially by ﬁrst estimating the joint wage-hours distribution
and then conditioning the structural labor supply model on these implied
gains to employment. As a result, two employment functions are estimated:
one in reduced form (as an auxiliary step necessary to control for selectivity
in the job oﬀer distribution estimation) and the other in structural form as
presented below.
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3.1 The Basic Model
Suppose that employers propose jobs characterized by an hourly wage rate(
wd
)
and a number of monthly hours worked
(
hd
)
. Given the diversity of
employers and jobs available in the labor market, a large number of
(
wd, hd
)
pairs can be proposed in the economy to a single person. The distribution of
proposed wage-hours pairs forms the labor demand set faced by the individ-
ual and is conditional upon his or her productive human capital characteris-
tics (X). We assume that demographic characteristics and family status do
aﬀect labor supply but do not aﬀect productive capacities, and are thus not
included in the vector X that determines labor demand. These additional
variables, and possibly some elements of X, are grouped into a vector Z that
aﬀects preferences.
Utility is deﬁned with respect to disposable income and hours worked as:
U (D (wh, y0, Z) , h;Z, ε)
where ε captures unobserved characteristics that aﬀect preferences on top
of Z. U is a classical utility function that depends on disposable income
and on hours worked. For identiﬁcation purposes, we will assume that an
individual's education, although it aﬀects the set of job oﬀers that he or she
faces, does not directly aﬀect preferences (conditional on Z). The function
D (·) computes disposable income, based on labor earnings (wh), wealth (y0)
and family characteristics relevant to compute taxes and transfers (at most a
subset of Z). When not working, utility is therefore U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε)
and depends only on y0, Z and ε.
We assume that individuals receive job oﬀers from the joint distribution
of
(
wd, hd|X
)
. A person will accept any such oﬀer which provides at least
the utility of not working, that is when:
U
(
D
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)
, hd;Z, ε
)
≥ U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε) (1)
Even if ε is independent from
(
wd, hd|X
)
, the distribution of observed wages
and hours is not representative of the distribution of
(
wd, hd|X
)
because
condition 1 restricts the set of observed values. For instance, if U ′D > 0,
observed wages may be on average higher than proposed wages. For this
reason, selectivity must be accounted for when estimating the distribution
of
(
wd, hd|X
)
. The existence of variables in Z, such as family composition,
and y0, assumed not to aﬀect proposed wages and hours, is suﬃcient to iden-
tify conditional means as in most selectivity models. However, parametric
distributional assumptions are also needed to recover the full distribution.
With an estimate of the distribution of
(
wd, hd|X
)
we can proceed in two
directions. First, we can describe the size of the monetary work incentive
7
provided by the legislation to any individual, as measured by the distribution
of
D
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)
−D (0, y0, Z)
where the ﬁrst term is derived from the distribution of proposed wages and
hours. This answers the question: Does work pay?
Such a comparison is also valid in a present value context, provided that
utility when working and utility when not working are discounted using a
common discount factor, ρ. However it ignores the time-limited nature of the
intéressement scheme that temporarily reduces implicit marginal tax rates.
Call tI the number of periods of intéressement available to a given person
(due to the maximum 750 hours entitlement), DI (wh, y0, Z) the disposable
income for those periods and D0 (wh, y0, Z) disposable income thereafter.
When tI > 0, we may compare the present value of disposable income com-
puted as
D (wh, y0, Z) =
tI−1∑
t=0
ρtDI (wh, y0, Z) +
∞∑
t=tI
ρtD0 (wh, y0, Z)
with
D (0, y0, Z) =
∞∑
t=0
ρtD0 (0, y0, Z) .
Having estimated the distribution of job oﬀers and characterized dispos-
able income and present value measures of disposable income, we return to
the relation between disposable income and labor supply. Equation 1 can
be treated as a structural labor supply equation that depends on individual
preferences and observed or potential earnings. Taking simple a functional
form, we assume that a job with (w, h) is accepted when:
α [logD (wh, y0, Z)− logD (0, y0, Z)] + βk (h) + Zδ + ε > 0 (2)
where α is the coeﬃcient of disposable income in the utility function, β
reﬂects the taste for work and δ captures diﬀerences in the preference for
work related to demographic characteristics. We assume two alternative
functional forms for k (h) in our structural estimation: k (h) = log (h) and
k (h) = 1{h∈Full Time}. Thus β is negative if people dislike work (conditional
on income). Explicit derivations and normalizations, as well as the likelihood
function implied by such a model, are detailed in appendix B.
The main source of identiﬁcation of the distribution of job oﬀers comes
from the presence of variables in Z that are not in X, and conversely the
parameters of the utility function in this model are identiﬁed by the presence
of variables in X that are not in Z. As is standard for this literature, we
exclude family characteristics from X and education from Z. Intuitively,
excluding family characteristics from X provides a source of variation in the
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probability of accepting a job that is not related to the determinants of the
job oﬀer itself, allowing us to trace the shape of the job oﬀer distribution for
a given X vector . Likewise, excluding education from Z provides a source of
variation within the set of accepted job oﬀers that is not due exclusively to
the observable determinants of preferences across jobs, allowing us to observe
changes in employment probabilities for a given Z vector and thus map out
preferences. It should be noted that the parameters of the utility function
would be (locally) identiﬁed even without this latter exclusion restriction
due to the conditionalities10 and discontinuities in the D (•, •, •) function.
Inevitably, the various functional forms that we assume throughout our esti-
mation also contribute to the identiﬁcation of the various model parameters
(especially with respect to the job oﬀer distribution), although we assume
as ﬂexible functional forms as possible throughout in order to minimize the
risk that speciﬁcation error will aﬀect our results.
Note also that, given the discrete nature of this model, comparing em-
ployed individuals with diﬀerent earnings would provide no information on
preferences (all of them have preferred observed earnings to no earnings).
In contrast to usual continuous labor supply models,11 identiﬁcation of pref-
erences in our model thus relies on the comparison between employed and
non-employed agents along dimensions that determine the particular job of-
fers they receive, i.e. the elements of the X vector that are not in Z.
3.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation and Estimation
There are several important institutional features that need to be accommo-
dated in our empirical modeling of the joint wage-hours distribution. First,
the RMI levels are set such that a full-time job paid the hourly minimum
wage raises income signiﬁcantly, relative to being on welfare. Part-time work
is therefore a central issue, as it is the potential source of incentive problems.
Furthermore, the existence of a minimum wage12 generates a mass point in
the distribution of hourly wages that must be taken into account. These
two considerations imply that ﬂexible distributional assumptions, or semi-
or non-parametric estimators, are warranted. On another hand, inferring the
full unconditional distribution from the observed distribution that is condi-
tional on selection into employment is impossible unless the distribution is
10Examples of such conditionalities include housing allowances that depend on public
or private housing sector, home ownership status and geographic zones.
11In many continuous labor supply models, hours are supposed to be a choice variable
for the individual. Hours variation conditional on wages can thus be used to gather
information on preferences. In our setting, hours are not chosen by the individual per
se, but rather each person is faced with a take-it-or-leave-it job oﬀer. In this context, as
the wage-hours pair is set by the employer, hours variation conditional on wages is not
suﬃcient to infer preferences.
12Much research has been devoted to studying the empirical importance of the minimum
wage in France. See, for example, CSERC (1999) and Abowd et. al. (2000).
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parameterized. As we are interested in characterizing the entire distribution
of gains to employment, we use mixtures of normal and logistic distributions
so as to mimic observed distributions within a strictly parametric frame-
work.13
One key institutional speciﬁcity is the prevalence of a widespread public
employment program, the Employment Solidarity Contract (Contrat emploi
solidarité, or CES ), that provides half-time jobs at the minimum wage plus
a speciﬁc top-up income (but no rights to standard intéressement). In our
data, roughly one third of all RMI recipients in the sample that are ob-
served later in employment have CES jobs, which can only be held in the
public sector.14 Zoyem (1999) shows that this sort of contract is frequently
proposed to RMI recipients, and is occasionally incorporated into an indi-
vidual's reinsertion contract.15 The possibility that a CES job oﬀer, rather
than a regular market job oﬀer, may be received is modelled explicitly.
The structure of the wage-hours model consists mainly of four correlated
probit equations: one for being oﬀered a CES or not, one for being oﬀered a
market job at the minimum wage vs. above, one for being oﬀered a full-time
market job vs. part-time and one for selectivity into employment. Condi-
tional on being oﬀered a job above the minimum wage, an equation estimates
the shape of the truncated wage distribution above it; conditional of being
oﬀered a full-time job, an equation estimates the shape of the hours distribu-
tion around the full-time mode; a similar equation is estimated for part-time.
Although the four main probit equations are estimated conditional on X (or
X and Z for the selection equation), the wage and hours distributions for
regular jobs are not treated as individual speciﬁc, i.e. conditional on observ-
able characteristics. This constraint, imposed because of a lack of variability
in the data, can be interpreted as saying that there is screening at entry
into diﬀerent types of jobs but that the wage and hours distributions are
insensitive to individual characteristics given the set of individuals employed
in each job type. The details of the econometric speciﬁcation can be found
in appendix B.
Anticipating our estimation results, ﬁgures 3a-3b illustrate the perfor-
mance of this statistical model. The observed distributions of wages and
hours are compared with their distributions simulated from this model (con-
ditional on employment) on the employed population. In spite of its very
parametric nature, the presence of mixtures and proper accounting for trun-
13The distributional assumptions were based purely on goodness-of-ﬁt criteria, as we do
not wish to impose any a priori beliefs about any underlying distributions in the economy.
14Private sector employers can exploit a number of other subsidised employment schemes
that may be relevant for RMI recipients; see L'Horty (2006) for a recent survey. Empir-
ically, however, none of these other schemes provide as important a destination for RMI
recipients as CES contracts.
15Reinsertion contracts are programs negotiated between the RMI recipient and his or
her caseworker, generally intended to help the RMI recipient plan his or her transition
from welfare back into work (Zoyem, 1999).
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cation appear to generate a remarkably good ﬁt. Moreover, the observed
share of employed at the minimum wage is 69.78% and the estimated share
is 69.45%.
Insert Figures 3a and 3b Around here
4 Job Oﬀer Distribution Estimation Results
In this section, we provide some basic descriptive analysis concerning the
jobs that RMI recipients obtain when they leave the RMI. We then present
the results of estimating the proposed wage and hours distributions. The
data (the Outcomes for RMI Recipients Survey, or L'Enquête sur le devenir
des personnes sorties du RMI ) consists of a representative sample of 2,764
RMI recipients surveyed in 1996 and again one year later. The ﬁrst wave
deﬁnes the sample while the second wave is used to describe their labor
market status. The sample is restricted to individuals 17-55 years old at the
second survey date and, in the structural labor supply model, we further
restrict the sample to single persons in order to avoid complicated issues of
collective labor supply decision making. Single persons comprise two thirds
of the sample and more than half of single women on RMI raise children. A
detailed presentation of the data set and descriptive statistics are provided
in appendix C.
4.1 Job Oﬀer Estimation Results
The results of estimating the distribution of job oﬀers, as described in sec-
tion 3, are presented in table 1. The models were estimated separately for
men and women. All continuous variables used in the estimation are stan-
dardized to be mean 0 and to have a unit standard deviation, implying that
the coeﬃcients are interpretable as the eﬀect of a single standard deviation
change in the corresponding variables. Our base regressors include a set of
indicator variables corresponding to the highest degree obtained (the ref-
erence is primary education), a quadratic polynomial in age, an indicator
variable for French nationality and another for living in the Paris region.
Disposable income on welfare and other demographic characteristics are in-
cluded only in the selection equation and represent our primary exclusion
restrictions. Overall, the explanatory power of the observed variables in our
model seems limited, and this is likely related to the fact that we study a
relatively homogeneous population, at least in terms of their labor market
prospects.
4.1.1 Selection Into Employment
As the correlation coeﬃcients between the selection equation and the various
other models make clear, selection bias is an issue for men in the CES equa-
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tion16 and for women in the minimum wage and working time models. It is
clear that the probability of employment increases with education for both
sexes, signiﬁcantly so for technical or professional education (category 4).
Having children, especially young children, reduces the chance that a female
who was on welfare in 1996 will be employed in January 1998, although this
supply-side mechanism does not appear relevant for men. Women in cou-
ples and widows are much less likely to be employed than women who have
never been married (conditional on age), whereas men in couples are signif-
icantly more likely to be observed in employment relative to never-married
men. The proﬁle of employment with respect to age is essentially ﬂat for
women, whereas the probability of employment decreases with age for men
who received RMI beneﬁts in 1996, at least initially.
It is interesting to note that the reduced form coeﬃcients on disposable
income from welfare (D (0, y0, Z)) are generally positive, and signiﬁcantly so
for women. This implies that additional income provided by the RMI may
not reduce the probability of an individual being observed in employment; on
the contrary, higher disposable income while on welfare may actually be as-
sociated with an increase in subsequent employment among one-time welfare
recipients. That said, the model outlined in section 3.1 has no implication
for the sign of this eﬀect, because D (0, y0, Z) is generally correlated with
D (wh, y0, Z) and it is the diﬀerence between the two that is relevant for job
acceptance.
4.1.2 CES and Regular Jobs
Table 1 suggests that CES jobs are less common in the Paris region than
elsewhere in France, and that the probability that a woman draws a CES
is concave with respect to her age. The correlation coeﬃcients suggest,
especially for men, that the unobserved events that make a person likely
to be employed also increase the chances that the job will be a CES. This
may suggest cream-skimming behavior on behalf of case workers, since the
case worker is the main source of information about these jobs for most RMI
recipients (Zoyem, 1999).
Considering the wage and working time models, the estimated intercepts
of the minimum wage model imply that the probability of drawing a mini-
mum wage job (for men and women) is roughly 0.85 for a person with mean
values of all characteristics included in the model. Furthermore, it appears
that the probability that a female welfare recipient will draw a minimum
wage job decreases initially with her age then increases again later in life.
Among both men and women who do not draw a CES job oﬀer, the most
16The tendency of the estimated parameter to head toward the upper bound suggests
that this correlation coeﬃcient may be poorly identiﬁed. However, this appears to be
primarily a sampling issue (and not a case of the parameter being fundamentally uniden-
tiﬁable), since the same parameter for women behaves much more reasonably.
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educated workers are signiﬁcantly less likely to draw a minimum wage job.
Education does not, however, seem to be signiﬁcantly related to the proba-
bility of drawing a (non-CES ) full-time job for men or women. Full-time jobs
are signiﬁcantly over-represented among women living in the Paris region,
however. As ﬁgure 2b shows that much of the dispersion in male working
time is due simply to the nature of the job (CES or non-CES ), it is not sur-
prising to see no signiﬁcant determinants in the male working time equation.
The remaining correlation coeﬃcients are only signiﬁcant for women,
and these are only signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Still, the signs are negative
for both men and women on the correlation between the minimum wage
and full time employment equations, suggesting that non-CES minimum
wage jobs are also more often part-time than full-time. There is also a
negative correlation for both men and women between the disturbances of
the employment and minimum wage equations, suggesting that those people
more likely to be seen in work are also less likely to draw a minimum wage
job when they are not oﬀered a CES.
5 The Gains to Employment
We use the results presented in table 1 to assign disposable income for each
household in the full (representative) sample. To do this, we draw wage
rates and working hours from their estimated distributions, unconditional
on employment status (this applies to everyone, whether employed or not).17
Given each household's simulated labor earnings, we then apply the system
of taxes and transfers present in France in 1998 and described in section 2,
to obtain a measure of disposable income while employed. We consider 2
alternative scenarios.
1. A baseline scenario: the intéressement top-up is computed for those
who are eligible until their eligibility runs out, then the individual is
subject to the regular earnings environment (including the RMI mini-
mum income guarantee) forever;
2. A comparison scenario for evaluating the importance of intéressement :
the job is held forever but everyone is assumed to have exhausted their
intéressement eligibility;18
17We draw 20 unconditional wage-hours pairs per observation (generating 55,280 points)
based on the full econometric model in order to obtain a smoother view of the overall
distribution.
18This scenario excludes intéressement payments for regular jobs, although it main-
tains the appropriate legislation in attributing top-up payments to any individual em-
ployed on a CES because they are not subject to exhaustion and these payments are
simply part of the CES scheme.
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Under each scenario, we compute the present value of disposable income
as explained in section 3.2 (to account for changes of income ﬂows over
time due to the intéressement rules) and convert it to a constant monthly
ﬂow.19 In the case of individuals living in couples, we assume that the
spouse/partner provides no additional labor income (modeling the joint labor
supply decision is beyond the scope of this paper). This is compared to the
monthly ﬂow of disposable income from the RMI (i.e. assuming no one
works) in order to calculate the gain to employment. Table 2 describes
the distribution of these gains for diﬀerent household types and under the
diﬀerent scenarios. Figures 4a-4c trace some of the distributions of gains for
the baseline scenario (singles only).
Insert Figures 4a, 4b and 4c Around Here
Our estimates suggest that almost every household gains from work in
the baseline case. This is because the 100% tax rate only applies in a very
particular circumstance: the household has exhausted its entitlement to in-
téressement, it does not get a CES job and earnings are below those of a
half-time minimum wage job (approximately). This combination happens
rarely. On the other hand, the value of the estimated monetary gains are
small. For comparability between household types, gains are also computed
either per adult equivalent or as a percentage increase over welfare income.
The highest gains are for single persons without children, and even then the
median gain is only 103.70 euros per month, while median gains are only
30 to 70 euros per person for single parents or couples. It should also be
noted that the large diﬀerence between mean and median gains suggests a
very skewed distribution of gains, with a large probability mass at low levels
(driven by CES jobs) and several higher gains that serve to pull the mean
upward: this is conﬁrmed by ﬁgures 4a-4c. Figure 4c also shows a small
mode for men around full-time work. For women, the distribution is multi-
modal because of the impact of the number of children (compare ﬁgures 4a
and 4b).
The results for women, especially single mothers, are potentially worri-
some and are due to a combination of factors. These women are found in
the lower tails of the distributions of wage rates and hours and they are sub-
ject to high implicit tax rates through the means-testing of family beneﬁts.
These small monetary gains would likely result in a net loss to single mothers
when child care costs (not measured here) are added in. The French transfer
system includes a special program to subsidize child care, while schooling is
free starting at age 3. But it is unlikely that this assistance at the margin
would be a suﬃcient complement to the very small estimated potential gains
to employment.
19We apply a monthly discount factor of 0.995, which is equivalent to an annual interest
rate of roughly 6%
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Comparing the baseline to the simulation without intéressement, it ap-
pears that the contribution of the intéressement scheme to the distribution
of gains is very limited. Intéressement mechanically ensures that 13% addi-
tional beneﬁciaries will have a strictly positive gain from working (increasing
the percentage with gains from 86% to 99%), but there is practically no vis-
ible diﬀerence in the amounts of the gains to employment. One reason is
that the 13% marginal beneﬁciaries are among the lowest paid, and as such
they contribute small gains.
The other reason for the apparently minor impact of the suppression of
the intéressement scheme is that the amount of additional gains provided
by intéressement is limited on average. Recall that, in this simulation, the
suppression of intéressement payments does not concern CES jobs, as they
are subject to a separate set of rules.20 In addition, the changes relative to
the baseline case do not apply to observations with household income above
twice the RMI threshold (because then eligibility to both RMI and intéresse-
ment is lost), while the top-up only corresponds to 50% of a small amount
when wages are small enough to beneﬁt from the intéressement scheme. Fi-
nally, since the top-up is only available for a limited amount of time (750
hours of work or less), the present value of the corresponding wealth is only
marginally aﬀected by the periods during which the top-up is available, even
if one applies a high discount factor. Overall, the features of the intéresse-
ment system, as of 1998, especially its time-limited nature, seem to imply
that it may have a very small potential to aﬀect incentives to work despite
the relatively large kinks in the disposable income proﬁles (see ﬁgure 1).
6 The Relation Between Gains to Work and Em-
ployment
The discussion thus far has been centered on the gains to employment for the
entire (representative) population of RMI recipients. However, the possible
monetary incentive eﬀects on labor supply of the RMI, insofar as they have
behavioral consequences, should be visible when comparing the simulated
gains of people actually observed in employment with those of people not
observed employed. In particular, equation 1 implies that those observed in
employment may tend to have larger gains to employment than comparable
workers not observed in employment.
6.1 Gains to Employment and Observed Employment Status
Figures 5a and 5b each compare three distributions of hours. Unconditional
(on employment status) distributions are simulated for the employed and
20This is the reason why the median values, which are primarily driven by the prevalence
of CES jobs, remain unaﬀected.
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the non-employed populations (dashed lines). Up to taxes and transfers,
this describes the ex ante incentives that are faced by each population and
depends only on structural diﬀerences in terms of observable characteristics.
It is clear that the population that was indeed observed employed has access
to longer working times. Moreover, the simulated probability that women
are oﬀered only the minimum wage is 82% in the employed population and
87% among the unemployed; these ﬁgures are 81% and 85% respectively for
men.
Insert Figures 5a and 5b Around Here
Given that people can only choose to accept or reject the jobs that are
proposed to them, observed wages and hours among the employed popula-
tion are again diﬀerent from jobs oﬀered to that population. This is, strictly
speaking, the selection eﬀect, drawn in solid line on the ﬁgures. For both
men and women, observed hours are more often around full-time, with clearly
higher wages:21 74% of women do work for the minimum wage (to be com-
pared to the simulated 82% oﬀered in the same population); the ﬁgure is 66%
for men (to be compared with the simulated 81%). Both composition and
selection eﬀects combine to generate very diﬀerent pictures of the observed
and potential wages. These results are intuitively appealing: they suggest
that jobs high in the earnings distribution are more likely accepted.
Table 3 decomposes the corresponding distributions of gains to employ-
ment under the baseline scenario. For the employed population, we compare
observed gains to gains that would result from the oﬀered (but not necessar-
ily accepted) wage-hours pairs. This is an alternative means of presenting
the selection eﬀect described above. We also compare potential gains for the
employed and non-employed populations. Although it is clear that a smaller
share of individuals among the population actually observed in employment
has positive simulated potential gains,22 it is also evident that the value of
these gains are, on average, larger. This is true for almost all cells in the ta-
ble. Furthermore, expressed in terms of gains, the selection eﬀect seems very
large: accepted jobs provide higher gains than the average potential job.
An important point to note is that this occurs because accepted jobs not
only involve a higher wage rate but also a longer working time. With more
than 80% of proposed jobs at the minimum wage, working time becomes an
important adjustment variable. It seems that welfare beneﬁciaries are more
willing to accept job oﬀers that propose longer hours, which may signify a
desire on their part to increase their gains from employment. Alternatively,
working more hours may be sought after as a means to leave welfare or at
least reduce its stigma (Laroque and Salanié, 2002). Structural estimates
21The ﬁgures draw marginal distributions, but the correlations estimated in table 1
imply that the eﬀect of wages reinforces that of hours, i.e. a lower probability of a
minimum wage job is associated with a higher probability of full-time employment.
22This is because the entitlement to intéressement in the non-employed population tends
to be larger, by construction.
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will conﬁrm this view.
6.2 Structural Labor Supply Estimation
In order to investigate the relation between gains to employment and labor
supply in further detail, we estimate by simulated maximum likelihood the
structural employment model deﬁned by equations 3 and 4 in appendix B.23
To avoid the complexities related to joint labor market decisions, table 4
presents the results of estimating this employment model on single-adult
households only (70% of the sample).
Although the model speciﬁcation is reduced to its basics, our estimation
presents some interesting results. As expected from the above discussion,
the income and hours variables have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on employment
probability, although their respective impacts (α and β in equation 2) are
diﬃcult to distinguish. The coeﬃcient on disposable income is high and
precisely estimated in the absence of the hours variable, suggesting that
labor supply is quite sensitive to potential gains in disposable income.
When working time is included, however, the estimated α is typically
reduced: individuals remain sensitive to disposable income variations when
making their labor supply decisions, but it appears that workers look for ex-
tra hours as a separate objective. In principle, the two eﬀects (preference for
income and preference with respect to working time) can be distinguished.
However, the coeﬃcient α is not always signiﬁcant. Hours alone explain
89% of the variance in gains for men and 78% for women, suggesting that
collinearity between income and hours may be driving the insigniﬁcant in-
come eﬀect when the full-time dummy is included. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that
these variables are jointly highly signiﬁcant (recall that the 99% conﬁdence
level for χ2 (2) is 9.21).24
It is worth noting that both men and women are more likely to accept
jobs that oﬀer more hours of work (for a given income), regardless of whether
hours are measured as a continuous variable or with a dummy. These re-
sults are compatible with estimates obtained by Laroque and Salanié (2003)
for the whole French female population, which leads us to believe that our
results are not simply an artifact of the limited variation in the hourly wage
variable.25 In our context, given that we focus on welfare recipients, the
stigma-based explanation for preferring additional hours is credible, as may
be explanations in which more monthly hours serve as a stepping stone out
of welfare and into the mainstream labor market.
23Details of the estimation are provided in appendix B.
24When the age variable is not present, there is less collinearity and the results are more
precise, but for a priori labor supply considerations we hesitate to put weight on such a
speciﬁcation.
25There is much more variation in the wage rate in Laroque and Salanié's (2003) data,
implying a more useful second source of identiﬁcation.
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Finally, table 4 indicates that older beneﬁciaries are less likely to be ob-
served working in 1998. This result is robust and very precisely estimated
and may reﬂect either discouragement on the part of welfare recipients or dis-
crimination on behalf of employers with respect to older workers in general.
Women with young children also work less and this eﬀect is also strong: one
more child aged below 3 would decrease the probability of a single woman
being employed by 90% on average. As noted above, this is consistent with
the idea that the very low gains that single women can expect from employ-
ment, coupled with the likely high costs of caring for small children, can
render negative the net return to working for a single mother with small
children.
The estimates in table 4 can be used to calculate the elasticity of employ-
ment with respect to an increase in gross earnings or disposable income. For
example, consider a small increase in disposable income of θ percent26 and
base earnings of wh. Using the approximation log (1 + θ) = θ, this gives:
e (wh; y0, Z) =
dP (Emp)
dD
× D
P (Emp)
≈ 1θ
[
P (αθ + α [logD (wh, y0, Z)− logD (0, y0, Z)] + βk (h) + Zδ + ε > 0)
P (α [logD (wh, y0, Z)− logD (0, y0, Z)] + βk (h) + Zδ + ε > 0) − 1
]
The elasticity parameter that we exploit integrates this expression over the
set of available job oﬀers for each individual in a population with given
characteristics, namely:
e (y0, Z) =
∫
w
∫
h
e (wh, ; y, Z) dF (w, h|X) .
Given that the function D (•, •, •) is highly nonlinear in its ﬁrst element,
we numerically evaluate this double integral with 500 draws from the joint
wage-hours job oﬀer distribution speciﬁc to each individual. These results
are then averaged over the full population or over subgroups deﬁned by a
particular subset of Z, in particular men versus women.
Table 4 describes our implied elasticities with respect to gross earnings
and with respect to disposable income for each of our model speciﬁcations.
Our estimates with respect to disposable income range from 1.25 to 0.39
for single men and from 1.10 to 0.44 for single women depending on the
speciﬁcation. As would be expected, the elasticity with respect to gross
earnings is always lower than the elasticity with respect to disposable income,
due to the tax and transfer system. The fact that the gap between the two
elasticities is larger in every speciﬁcation for women than for men reﬂects the
fact that women face higher implicit tax rates since they are more likely to
receive the RMI or intéressement payments even when working; i.e. single
26In practice, we use θ = 0.01 when calculating the elasticities given below.
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women are more often on the ﬂatter parts of the earnings-disposable income
proﬁles shown in ﬁgure 1 than single men. The elasticities are also lower
when controlling for hours worked, as our estimates in table 4 suggest an
independent role for hours in labor supply decisions (as noted above) that
leads the coeﬃcient in the speciﬁcation without hours to be biased upward.
These ﬁgures are within the bounds of estimates of the extensive margin
elasticities computed in the United States and France found elsewhere in
the literature. For example, Eissa et. al. (2004) survey the literature on
labor supply responses of single mothers to tax changes (in particular those
associated with the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC) during the 1980s
and 1990s in the United States. They ﬁnd almost no response at the intensive
margin (hours adjustment for people already working), but they ﬁnd an
elasticity of labor supply at the extensive margin (working or not working)
of 0.35 to 1.7. For France, Piketty (1998) ﬁnds elasticities ranging from 0.6
to 1 based on a natural experiment, although his sample of women is not
limited to welfare recipients. Laroque and Salanié (2003) use a structural
model and estimate an elasticity of 0.97 for women in couples but only 0.36
for single women. In all of these cases, our estimates (for single women) are
quite comparable to existing estimates in the literature.
It is worth remembering that our present value of income ﬂows are com-
puted using a 6% annual discount rate. Given the complexities of the system
and the possibility of myopia among a population that is somewhat removed
from regular labor market activity, welfare recipients may tend to discount
future income much more radically than we have previously assumed. To test
the implications of such behavior, we re-estimated the labour supply model
using higher discount rates for the income variable. This change is neutral
when income is constant over time since our speciﬁcation compares the logs
of disposable income. However, when incomes decrease with time (as is the
case for people receiving intéressement payments), increasing the discount
rate has the obvious eﬀect of scaling up measured gains to work. Although
the estimates should not change qualitatively, the estimated elasticities may
adjust downward. For instance, we ﬁnd that the elasticity with respect to
disposable income decreases from 0.54 to 0.33 (based on speciﬁcation (2)) for
women but remains unchanged for men (who receive intéressement payments
much less often) when we assume a 30% discount rate.
6.3 Policy Simulations Based on the Structural Estimation
Results
The structural model estimated in section 6.2 allows us to simulate the ex-
pected labor supply impacts of a number of diﬀerent policy changes.27 It
should be remembered, however, that our model is based on partial equilib-
27Labor supply in our simulations is based on speciﬁcation (2) in table 4.
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rium and thus large-scale policy experiments that could have macroeconomic
eﬀects can not reasonably be considered in this context. In particular, in all
of these simulations we assume that the above-minimum wage distribution,
the full and part time hours distributions, the probability of receiving CES
oﬀers, the probability of receiving a minimum wage job oﬀer and the proba-
bility of receiving a draw from the full time hours distribution are unaﬀected
by the policy changes that we simulate.
With this in mind, we consider the following alternative scenarios, which
we compare to our baseline scenario:
• Without intéressement
• With inﬁnite-duration intéressement
• With the Prime pour l'emploi (PPE) negative income tax
• With an increase in the minimum wage of 10%
For each of these situations, we consider two outcome measures, the
change in the level of employment (relative to the reference scenario) and
the public spending implications of the change.
The former eﬀect is evaluated in a straightforward manner (estimating
the probability of employment for each individual and taking the average
under each scenario), while the latter is more subtle. One can evaluate
the monthly value of net transfers made by the government, individual by
individual, when an individual works, as E (D (wh, y0, Z))− E (wh) (which
can be negative when wh exceeds twice the RMI threshold) while the monthly
value of net transfers made by the government when the individual is not
employed is E (D (0, y0, Z)) (which is always positive). This implies that that
one can evaluate the total impact of each scenario on government revenues
as:28
NetTransfers =
∑
i
{P (Empi) [E (D (wihi, y0,i, Zi))− E (wihi)]}
+ {[1− P (Empi)]D (0, y0,i, Zi)} .
We begin by presenting the baseline simulation in table 5. The baseline
scenario presents actual employment rates along with simulated ones using
the legislative framework actually in place in 1997. We simulate both earn-
ings and employment, and table 5 shows that our simulations are very close
to the observed employment rates due to the good ﬁt of the model. Under
the baseline scenario, net government transfers on average amount to 325
euros per month for single male welfare recipients and 521 euros for single
women. The higher transfers to women reﬂect the fact that single women
are more likely to raise children than single men, and child beneﬁts represent
a relatively large transfer amount.
28All probabilities and expectations are taken with respect to the joint distribution of
job oﬀers (wh), conditional on observed characteristics.
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6.3.1 No Intéressement Simulation
In this simulation, we calculate the disposable income from employment as if
the individual had exhausted all eligibility for intéressement payments and
thus received disposable income from work with no in-work beneﬁts. This
gives rise to a tiny decrease in disposable income on average: as noted above,
there are relatively few individuals who receive the earnings top-up and, in
a present value computation, the few months of intéressement payments
receive little weight. Therefore, the policy has almost no impact. As table 5
shows, the average monthly ﬂow of in-work disposable income falls by only
0.09% for men and 0.31% for women. Eliminating the intéressement system
would thus have very little negative impact on labor supply, with male labor
supply decreasing by 0.10% and female labor supply by 0.18%. However,
since the payments are so rarely made and represent such a small amount
of in-work disposable income, the eﬀect on public ﬁnances of eliminating
intéressement would be essentially nil.
6.3.2 Inﬁnite-Duration Intéressement Simulation
In this simulation we suppose that eligible individuals can receive intéresse-
ment in-work beneﬁts, according to the rules described in section 2 and
appendix A, indeﬁnitely. Given our method of converting present values to
monthly equivalents, this is the same as considering the case of complete
myopia for an individual with at least some rights to intéressement, in which
the date at which intéressement payments run out is never considered.
As seen in table 5, the average increase in disposable income at work
is not high (1.50% for men and 5.80% for women), both because of the
large share of CES contracts and because most full time workers exceed
the income threshold that renders them eligible for intéressement payments.
The employment impacts of extending intéressement beneﬁts forever would
be larger than those of eliminating the program (due to discounting and the
time-limited nature of these beneﬁts): female employment increases by 3.2%
and male employment by 1.5%. Such an increase in labor supply comes at
the relatively modest cost of one extra euro per month for single men and ten
extra euros per month for single women. These two simulations illustrate,
however, the small potential for aﬀecting labor supply of a policy instrument
that is so strongly limited in scope.
21
6.3.3 Negative Income Tax, or Prime Pour l'Emploi (PPE) Sim-
ulation
In this simulation we took the rules governing the PPE program29 at the
start of 2006 (applicable to earnings in 2005), inﬂated our 1998 earnings
to 2005 levels using purchasing power deﬂators, calculated eligibility and
amounts of negative income tax payments, deﬂated them back to 1998 levels
and added them to disposable income in the absence of intéressement case.
Although the value of the transfer remains small overall, it is highest for
individuals earning the equivalent of a full-time minimum wage, in contrast
with intéressement payments (that decline to zero at that point). The PPE
also beneﬁts individuals employed on a CES contract.
The net result of all of these changes, as shown by table 5, is that dispos-
able income in work increases much more in this simulation, especially for
men (+ 10.38%) because they are more often working full-time. Employment
now increases by 9% for men and 4% for women with respect to the baseline.
By contrast, average transfers increase by only 4.9% and 3.5% respectively.
This reform thus had the potential to bring about non-negligible changes in
labor supply at relatively little additional cost to the government.
6.3.4 10 Percent Minimum Wage Increase Simulation
This last simulation looks at the impact of increasing the minimum wage
by a signiﬁcant amount, in our case 10 percent.30 The model allows for
three diﬀerent mechanisms by which such an increase can aﬀect labor supply.
First, and most straightforwardly, earnings in a minimum wage job increase
by 10 percent (for a given number of hours worked). Second, the truncation
point of the distribution of above-minimum wage jobs shifts upward, making
expected earnings on non-minimum wage jobs higher as well. Finally, the
value of a CES job (which is paid the minimum wage plus a top-up) also
increases. The net impact on disposable income is limited, especially for
29The Prime Pour l'Emploi was introduced in 2001, with the objective of providing work
incentives at the bottom of the income distribution to a large base of working households.
It is not limited in time and is more generous than intéressement, especially for full-
time workers. For single persons, the premium represents 6% of labor earnings up to the
equivalent of full-time work at the minimum wage; it then decreases linearly to 0 at 1.4
times the full-time minimum wage. Parents also receive a lump-sum transfer of 62 euros
(in 1997 equivalents) per child. This transfer is cumulative with respect to other income
sources, with few restrictions (a minimum of approximately 50 hour per moth worked and,
for couples, a restriction on total household income).
30Our simulation holds constant the probability of receiving a minimum wage job oﬀer
when one does not receive a CES oﬀer. Although there is signiﬁcant work on the elasticity
of employment with respect to movements in the minimum wage in France (Dolado et.
al., 1996; Abowd et. al., 2000a; Abowd et. al., 2000b; Kramarz and Philippon, 2001),
there is to our knowledge no work on the impact of minimum wage movements on the size
of the spike at the minimum wage in the earnings distribution for France.
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women, by the high implicit tax rates on labor earnings and the resulting
low elasticities with respect to wage.
The net result of a 10% increase in the minimum wage is an increase in
disposable income of 7.35% for single men and 4.57% for single women in
our simulations. The eﬀects on the probability of employment are less than
those of the PPE (a 6% increase for single men and a 2% increase for single
women) but more than those of increasing intéressement indeﬁnitely for men
due to the fact that single men rarely receive intéressement payments. Inter-
estingly, increasing the minimum wage also reduces net government transfers
by 2.15% for men and by 1.0% for women. This is only partially driven by
the increased employment probability. A secondary implication of minimum
wage increases is that the diﬀerence between earnings when employed and
the RMI threshold is also reduced, which lowers the amount the government
must transfer as well. Whereas the former eﬀect is more important for single
men, the fact that women are more likely to have minimum (or low) wage
jobs then men means that the second eﬀect is likely to be more prevalent for
single women. It is worth remembering that our simulation does not allow for
demand-side eﬀects of a minimum wage increase; as a result, the equilibrium
outcome with respect to the probability of employment is uncertain.
6.4 Discussion
Overall, these structural estimates suggest that monetary incentives do af-
fect labor supply in this population. Although potential gains from working
are small on average for the whole population, selection eﬀects are observed
in the employed population and labor supply elasticities are of comparable
size to those found elsewhere in the literature. That said, the in-work ben-
eﬁt program (intéressement) does not seem to provide particularly strong
additional incentives to work, largely due to its time-limited nature and the
relative small range of gross earnings that are eligible for the program.
It must be noted that this is a strict labor supply interpretation of the
basic facts presented in the previous sections, although our estimation of
the job oﬀer distribution partially captures demand-side phenomena. In the
theoretical model, we do not allow the possibility that job oﬀers may not be
proposed at all to certain welfare recipients. It could be argued that indi-
viduals with more productive characteristics are also more likely to receive
oﬀers. In our speciﬁcation, the negative values of the intercept (table 4) can
be interpreted as implying that no work is preferred to very poorly paid,
short-hours work. If we were to incorporate a probability of receiving a job
oﬀer into our model at all, it would only be identiﬁed separately from this
intercept under strong additional conditions31 that would not be empirically
relevant in our data. Our implicit assumption is rather that a job can always
31Laroque and Salanié (2003) use an ad inﬁnitum type of reasoning to justify their
identiﬁcation of the probability of receiving a job oﬀer.
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be found (and represented by a draw from the distribution (wd, hd|X)), but
that the oﬀer may be so unattractive that most individuals would be re-
luctant to take it. Such an assumption is compatible with sociological ﬁeld
analysis of this population (Benarrosh, 2003).
Finally, note that our likelihood function implicitly assumes that welfare
beneﬁciaries only make one draw from the job oﬀer distribution which they
may take or leave. This is very much in line with the static approach to
labor supply. In contrast, Dickens and Lundberg (1993) allow workers to
choose among a random number of oﬀers. In such a context, those who had
the opportunity to choose between a larger number of alternatives would
select jobs with higher earnings and would therefore be more often observed
in employment. However, for the purpose of estimating the sensitivity of
preferences to disposable income, assuming (1) that some people have a
chance to draw a high wage or assuming (2) that some people have a chance
to make a large number of draws, among which there is more often a high
wage, are functionally equivalent.
7 Conclusion
The evaluation of potential labor earnings for recipients of a guaranteed min-
imum income transfer (such as the French RMI system) is a conceptually and
technically delicate exercise. It remains, nevertheless, an indispensable piece
of information in the debate concerning the incentive eﬀects on labor sup-
ply of welfare. Simulations for representative households and calculations
based exclusively on estimated eﬀective marginal tax rates are inadequate,
in that they do not account for the heterogeneity in labor market conditions
that RMI recipients face. In this paper, we have considered the interaction
between the labor market and the system of taxes and transfers in eﬀect
in France in 1998 (with the exception of local taxes and local transfers) ac-
counting for the presence of the supplemental earnings top-up provided by
the welfare system under the name of intéressement. Since RMI recipients
tend to be very diﬀerent from the population as a whole in terms of their
reemployment labor earnings, it is important to use an RMI-centered survey
to obtain reasonable sample sizes of the population of interest. But since the
sorts of jobs to which RMI recipients can aspire tend to be rather particu-
lar, most notably due to the predominance of active labor market programs
(such as France's CES jobs), it becomes essential to specify a model to pre-
dict wage and hours oﬀers that ﬁts the observed data on welfare recipients
as well as possible.
We ﬁnd that almost all welfare beneﬁciaries would gain from being em-
ployed on a job randomly drawn from the distribution of job oﬀers, relative
to staying on welfare. But the size of the gains is extremely small. As of
1998, the intéressement scheme provided only marginal additional incentives
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due to its time-limited nature. This may be part of the reasoning behind the
modiﬁcation of the rules governing the intéressement scheme in 1998 and
2001 which extend its applicability from 750 hours to about one year and
reduce the implicit marginal tax rate from 50% to 0% during the ﬁrst three
months. Most strikingly, the monetary work incentives for single mothers are
very limited. Were we able to directly integrate child care costs and locally
available means-tested assistance policies, we would almost surely ﬁnd a net
loss associated with work for French single mothers.
We ﬁnd that the distribution of gains that we estimate for the popu-
lation of individuals actually observed in employment diﬀers from that of
those individuals observed out of employment at the time of the follow-up
survey. We interpret this as a labor supply eﬀect and quantify it based on a
simple structural employment model, although some of our point estimates
are imprecise, in part due to the high degree of collinearity between dis-
posable income and hours worked. Our estimated extensive margin labor
supply elasticities, in the range of 1.25 to 0.39 for men and 1.10 to 0.44 for
women (depending on the speciﬁcation) are quite comparable to extensive
margin labor supply elasticities estimated on similar populations elsewhere
in the United States- and France-based literature, and our policy simula-
tions suggest that although the intéressement program may not be the ideal
mechanism for increasing labor supply among welfare recipients, other policy
instruments (such as the Prime Pour l'Emploi negative income tax, imple-
mented in France in 2001) are more promising. Alternatively, the estimated
preference for full time work suggests that a policy aimed at increasing the
supply of these sorts of jobs might be particularly eﬀective.
Overall, it appears that French welfare recipients are relatively sensitive
to monetary incentives when making labor supply decisions, but the existing
system only provides limited incentives for welfare recipients to work. Our
policy simulations suggest that changing the structure of the monetary in-
centives has the potential to bring quite a few additional individuals oﬀ of
welfare and into work, and the cost to the government of providing these
incentives may not be prohibitive.
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A The French Welfare System
The main component of France's welfare system at the national level is the
Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI), a guaranteed minimum income pro-
gram accessible to any person aged 25 and over,32 provided that the sum
of all resources available to his or her household is below a threshold that
depends on family composition. These take the form of a monetary transfer
that brings household resources up to the threshold. Other guaranteed in-
come programs (with restricted access) do exist, such as those for the elderly,
handicapped, widows and widowers and single parents with children below
3.33 These other programs are typically more generous than RMI, and the
transfers for the handicapped and the elderly cover a large number of peo-
ple, while the population covered by the widow/widower beneﬁts is rather
limited. However, the role of these transfers in aﬀecting the labor market be-
havior of those concerned is likely to be quite diﬀerent from that of the RMI.
Finally, the unemployed who have exhausted their unemployment beneﬁts
have access to a speciﬁc beneﬁt whose amount is similar to that of RMI.34
When comparing labor income with welfare income, additional transfers
related to family composition and housing must be considered. Most family
composition-based beneﬁts are means tested, increase with the number of
children, and vary with the presence or absence of children under 3 years
old.35 We exclude the Allocation parentale d'éducation, or APE,36 which is
available to every household with at least 2 children of which one is less than
3 years old, provided one of the spouses does not work or works part time and
can justify at least 2 years of work over the last 5 or 10 years (depending
on the number of children). This last beneﬁt was being paid to roughly
300,000 French women with 2 children (for which the amount was roughly 365
Euros/month) and roughly 180,000 French women with 3 or more children
(for which the amount was roughly 450 Euros/month) on December 31, 1997
(Piketty, 2005). We cannot consider this beneﬁt because information on
past employment in the data is insuﬃcient to determine eligibility. Although
Piketty (1998) has shown that this transfer has signiﬁcant labor supply eﬀects
(up to half of the recipients of this program may have withdrawn from the
32This age restriction does not apply for people with underage dependents.
33This last beneﬁt, called the Allocation du Parent, or API, cannot be received for more
than 3 years total.
34Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to observe individuals who receive the single
parents with young children beneﬁt or the transfer in the event of unemployment beneﬁt
exhaustion.
35In particular, every household responsible for at least 2 children is entitled to a transfer
(Allocations familiales). The additional, means-tested, transfers considered in this paper
are the Complement familial, Allocation pour jeune enfant and Allocation de rentrée sco-
laire.
36A subsidy for children in school which was introduced in 1995 (Aide à la scolarité) is
also not considered here.
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labor force due to its disincentive eﬀects), it is not particularly relevant for
our data. First, the transfers are well below the RMI threshold for single
persons with the corresponding number of children, so that no single should
claim it. As a result, the labor supply section of the paper is not sensitive to
this. For couples, this scheme has the potential to increase disincentives, but
only in particular segments of the potential earnings distribution of the wife
and husband. This implies that although we may understate disincentives
in the gains to employment computations, this problem is likely to occur
only in what is likely to be a small (but unknowable in our data) share of
couples in which one of the spouses has suﬃcient work experience to qualify.
B Econometric Speciﬁcation
In order to further investigate the link between gains to employment and
observed employment, we estimate the structural model based on equation
1. Taking simple functional forms for the utility functions, we set:
U (D (wh, y0, Z) , h;Z, ε) = α logD (wh, y0, Z) + k(h) + Zδ + ε
when working, and:
U (D (0, y0, Z) , 0;Z, ε) = α logD (0, y0, Z) + k(0) + Zδ0 + ε0
if not working. We normalize k(0) = δ0 = ε0 = 0 and var(ε) = 1. This
implies that all parameters, but α, must be interpreted as measuring an eﬀect
relative to non-working. In practice, function k(h) will be either β log h or
β times an indicator variable for more than 130 monthly hours. Assuming
that ε is independent of (wd, hd|X),37 the contribution to the likelihood for
working individuals is:
P (Employment at w, h|X,Z, y0) = P (ε ≥ α [logD (0, y0, Z)
− logD (wh, y0, Z)]
−k(h)− Zδ)
×f(w, h|X)
(3)
and for non-working individuals:
P (Non-Employment |X,Z, y0) =
∫
wd
∫
hd P (ε < α [logD (0, y0, Z)
− logD
(
wdhd, y0, Z
)]
−k(hd)− Zδ
)
×f(wd, hd|X)dwddhd
(4)
37This technical assumption, also made by van Soest (1995), simpliﬁes the estimation
by allowing us to estimate sequentially the job oﬀer distribution and labor supply.
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where the joint distribution f(wd, hd|X) has been estimated as described
below. The assumption of independence between ε and (wd, hd|X) means
that we can just condition on realized (w, h), instead of the full density, when
maximizing the likelihood function.
B.1 Estimation of the Joint Wage-Hours Distribution
Given the considerations described in section 3.2, we estimate the following
statistical models.
A CES is proposed when
XβC + uC ≥ 0 (5)
If a CES oﬀer is not received, a regular job wage is drawn. It is paid
the minimum wage, w = w, if
XβS + uS ≥ 0 (6)
Otherwise, the wage is drawn in a truncated wage distribution with density
fw(w|w > w) = fw(w)/P (w > w)
and the underlying density of w is generalized logistic:
fw(w) =
exp((w −m)/s)
s (1 + exp((w −m)/s))2
where parameters m and s are estimated.
Hours worked can be drawn from a full-time distribution or a part time
distribution. If
XβH + uH ≥ 0 (7)
then hours is drawn from a full-time truncated distribution with density
f1h
(
h|h > 0, h ≤ h
)
= f1h(h)/P
(
h > 0, h ≤ h
)
where h is the maximum working time.38 Otherwise, the hours worked are
drawn from the part time density f2h
(
h|h > 0, h ≤ h
)
, deﬁned in a similar
manner. The underlying densities are also generalized logistic:
fih(h) =
exp ((h−mi) /si)
si (1 + exp ((h−mi) /si))2
, i = 1, 2
38As we have no a priori knowledge of the maximum monthly working time of the set
of oﬀered jobs, we used the sample maximum for each sex to deﬁne h, which is the best
nonparametric estimator of this parameter. For men, h = 312, while for women, h = 333.
32
We setm1 = 169, the standard full-time monthly hours worked andm2 = 87,
the standard half-time hours worked. Parameters s1 and s2 are estimated.
Finally, in order to account for the selectivity into employment, we as-
sume that a reduced form to equation 1 can be approximated by
(X,Z,D0 (0, y0, Z))γ + η ≥ 0 (8)
Although this linear approximation is questionable with respect to the struc-
tural interpretation of the equation, it must be clear that, at this stage, this
equation is only meant to control for selectivity, using variables in Z excluded
from X.
All residuals (uC , uS , uH , η) are assumed to be jointly normally distributed.
However, it was necessary to impose the constraints ρuC ,uS = 0 and ρuC ,uH =
0 in order to obtain convergence. Intuitively, these constraints mean that
we suppose that the unobserved characteristics that make an individual dis-
proportionately likely to be selected for a CES contract are uncorrelated
with the unobserved characteristics that make the same individual more or
less likely to ﬁnd a minimum wage or a part time job. Such an assumption
is not unreasonable given the institutional context, since it is typically the
case workers that serve as intermediaries between RMI recipients and CES -
contract proposers (who are necessarily public sector employers), whereas it
is the market that sorts individuals into minimum wage and part time work.
Because of data limitations, we were forced to adopt a very simple speci-
ﬁcation for the structural estimation. For women, the only control variables
in the Z vector are age and the number of children in three age classes. For
men, only age is maintained because the number of children appeared ir-
relevant. The potential gains (expressed in logarithms) are computed using
the baseline scenario. The model is estimated by simulated maximum like-
lihood, using 500 draws to estimate the joint distribution of (wd, hd|X) in
the evaluation of the double integral in equation 4 and assuming a standard
normal distribution for ε.39
C The Data
We use the Outcomes for RMI Recipients Survey (Devenir des personnes
sorties du RMI, see Fougère and Rioux, 2001), which was undertaken by the
French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) in
collaboration with several other public institutions. A representative sam-
ple of RMI recipients was drawn and surveyed in December of 1996 and a
follow-up survey was then administered one year later, in January 1998. We
exploit this second cross-section which includes, along with demographic and
39Note that the standard errors reported in this table are not corrected for the presence
of estimated regressors, notably the gains to employment and the hours oﬀer for people
not observed in employment.
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household characteristics, information concerning the employment status of
the person, in particular his or her monthly earnings and hours (if employed)
as well as all of the information necessary to reconstruct the other transfers
for which the household is eligible. This last point is particularly important,
since the housing subsidies introduce a highly nonlinear, and sometimes dis-
continuous, relation between labor earnings and disposable income (see sec-
tion 2); it is thus critical to be able to identify precisely the households that
have access to this subsidy and to adjust their disposable income accordingly.
Residual eligibility for intéressement payments at the follow-up survey
date is not directly measured. Nevertheless, it depends on the time spent
working in the past months or years, according to a complex set of rules. We
use activity calendars to calculate the number of hours during which each
individual may still be eligible for intéressement payments as of January
1998. We were able to reconstruct this information for 87% of the sample.
By construction, the remaining 13% are individuals with neither long periods
of employment nor long periods of non-employment over the past year.40
When eligibility is available, we ﬁnd that 72% of the population has the
opportunity to beneﬁt the RMI top-up for the full 750 hours, whereas 19%
has exhausted this possibility and would get the disposable incomes drawn
on the bottom lines of ﬁgures 1 and 2. The remaining 9% is eligible, but for
less than 750 hours, with residual hours distributed rather smoothly. These
ﬁgures are decomposed by gender in the Appendix table.
We use the survey both to estimate the structure of wages and hours avail-
able to RMI recipients and to simulate the potential gains to employment for
the entire population of RMI recipients. We restrict our attention to people
between 17 and 55 years old, and we exclude students and retirees and some
missing observations, which leaves us with 2,764 beneﬁciaries. Descriptive
statistics are presented in Appendix tables 1 and 2. We also eliminate self-
employment for the estimation of potential income. We assume 100 percent
take-up of transfers for which the household is eligible in the simulations.41
This provides us with a lower bound on the gains from employment. In order
to avoid the complicated issue of simultaneous labor supply decision making
within households, couples are excluded from the sample when we examine
the link between gains to employment and observed employment.42
The data is also subject to measurement error with respect to reported
earnings and hours. Monthly earnings as well as usual weekly hours are
40The subsamples for which residual intéressement rights can and cannot be calculated
are roughly similar on the basis of observable characteristics, and as a result we perform
the majority of our analyses only on the sample for which we are able to reconstruct
residual rights to intéressement payments.
41Our data do not contain suﬃcient information to measure take-up rates accurately.
See Gilles-Simon and Legros (1996) and Terracol (2003) for analyses of beneﬁt take-up in
France.
42Individuals in couples do, however, contribute to the estimation of the wage and hours
oﬀer distributions.
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recorded by the survey. It appears that a signiﬁcant portion (roughly one
third) of the hourly wage rates computed from this information lie below the
minimum wage. Most of these inconsistencies are obviously due to rounding
errors and the fact that relatively few individuals in the sample are paid
above from the minimum wage in this population. Thus, whenever reported
hourly wages fall below the minimum wage, we assume that monthly earnings
are more reliable than monthly hours, set the hourly wage to the minimum
wage and recompute hours based on reported monthly earnings so as to be
compatible with existing minimum wage laws.
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Selection Full-time work
Intercept -0,7140 *** -1,1522 *** 1,0296 ** 0,4126
(0,1358) (0,1256) (0,4426) (0,6342)
Age -0,8298 ** -0,2377 0,1595 -1,2293
(0,4046) (0,4330) (0,8186) (0,9280)
Age2 0,5179 0,0733 -0,1164 1,2283
(0,4093) (0,4369) (0,8226) (0,9378)
French Nationality -0,0811 -0,1623 -0,3367 -0,1594
(0,1148) (0,1258) (0,2609) (0,3015)
Paris Region -0,1829 -0,5570 *** -0,2518 0,2077
(0,1161) (0,1747) (0,2773) (0,2714)
Education Category 1 (higher) 0,6280 *** -0,1067 -0,6378 * -0,3982
(0,1424) (0,1811) (0,3285) (0,3975)
Education Category 2 (upper sec.) 0,3893 *** -0,0841 0,0823 0,0143
(0,1470) (0,1825) (0,3527) (0,3892)
Education Category 3 (lower sec.) -0,0645 0,0100 -0,0019 -0,2104
(0,1390) (0,1470) (0,3245) (0,3642)
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0,2713 ** 0,1350 -0,2508 0,2018
(0,1229) (0,1362) (0,2915) (0,3432)
Log(D 0 (0, y 0 , Z)) 0,0263
(0,0750)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0,0436
(0,0427)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old -0,0479
(0,0530)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0,0782 *
(0,0421)
Couple 0,3266 **
(0,1474)
Widow 0,2708
(0,4140)
Divorced 0,1614
(0,1432)
Wage and hours dist. parameters
m 3,3704 ***
(0,1895)
s 0,1711 ***
(0,0275)
s1 2,8649 ***
(0,2344)
s2 60,4063 ***
(8,2833)
ρ Employment, CES 0,9981 ***
(0,1608)
ρ Minimum Wage, Working Time -0,2146
(0,1865)
ρ Employment, Minimum Wage -0,4105
(0,4020)
ρ Employment, Working Time -0,1806
(0,5134)
# observations 1303
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Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors of estimates of constrained parameters (s, s 1 , s 2 and the various ρ ) obtained using the delta method. *** indicates a
coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** indicates a coefficient signficant at the 5% level and * indicates a coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
Table 1 : Results of Selection-Corrected CES and Wage - Working Time Models
Men
CES Min. wage
Selection Full-time work
Intercept -0,7189 *** -0,6495 1,0297 ** -1,2948 **
(0,1650) (0,4596) (0,4738) (0,5563)
Age -0,0865 0,9233 *** -1,6578 * -1,0051
(0,3555) (0,1793) (0,9105) (1,1546)
Age2 -0,0259 -1,1507 *** 1,7457 * 0,6519
(0,3566) (0,1679) (0,9071) (1,2394)
French Nationality -0,0708 -0,0381 -0,0250 -0,1902
(0,1404) (0,2440) (0,3234) (0,4287)
Paris Region -0,0073 -1,0405 *** -0,1011 0,4475 *
(0,1252) (0,2799) (0,2119) (0,2411)
Education Category 1 (higher) 0,8201 *** -0,3595 -0,9690 *** 0,6905
(0,1513) (0,3259) (0,3141) (0,4731)
Education Category 2 (upper sec.) 0,7031 *** -0,0706 -0,2176 -0,1503
(0,1421) (0,2945) (0,3363) (0,5309)
Education Category 3 (lower sec.) 0,2055 0,0654 -0,1392 -0,4740
(0,1252) (0,2337) (0,2872) (0,5223)
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0,4135 *** 0,1091 0,1031 -0,1118
(0,1204) (0,2414) (0,3122) (0,5063)
Log(D 0 (0, y 0 , Z)) 0,1838 ***
(0,0648)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0,3549 ***
(0,0576)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old -0,1364 **
(0,0602)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old -0,0501
(0,0446)
Couple -0,4618 ***
(0,1133)
Widow -0,5580 **
(0,2338)
Divorced -0,0740
(0,0986)
Wage and hours dist. parameters
m 3,4005 ***
(0,1935)
s 0,1981 ***
(0,0349)
s1 2,5135 ***
(0,3361)
s2 38,6605 ***
(3,1113)
ρ Employment, CES 0,4028
(0,2714)
ρ Minimum Wage, Working Time -0,3294 *
(0,1767)
ρ Employment, Minimum Wage -0,5487 *
(0,2921)
ρ Employment, Working Time 0,5592 *
(0,3021)
# observations 1461
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Table 1 (Continued): Results of Selection-Corrected CES and Wage - Working Time Models
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors of estimates of constrained parameters (s, s 1 , s 2 and the various ρ ) obtained using the delta method. *** indicates a
coefficient significant at the 1% level, ** indicates a coefficient signficant at the 5% level and * indicates a coefficient significant at
the 10% level.
CES Min. wage
Women
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0,99 223,64 103,70 0,86 221,88 103,70
Single female, no children 0,97 224,20 103,70 0,85 222,33 103,70
Single female, 1 child 0,99 148,93 103,70 0,72 145,69 103,70
Single female, 2 children 0,97 168,64 103,70 0,78 165,93 103,70
Single female, > 2 children 1,00 251,35 193,56 0,88 249,73 193,56
Single male, no children 0,99 281,30 103,70 0,95 280,74 103,70
Single male, with children 1,00 232,59 103,70 0,94 231,70 103,70
Couple, no children 0,99 178,30 103,70 0,86 176,65 103,70
Couple, 1 child 0,99 183,23 103,70 0,80 180,52 103,70
Couple, 2 children 0,98 170,23 103,70 0,80 167,37 103,70
Couple, > 2 children 0,99 228,42 119,20 0,86 226,37 118,87
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0,99 174,62 103,70 0,86 173,48 103,70
Single female, no children 0,97 224,20 103,70 0,85 222,33 103,70
Single female, 1 child 0,99 99,29 69,13 0,72 97,13 69,13
Single female, 2 children 0,97 84,32 51,85 0,78 82,97 51,85
Single female, > 2 children 1,00 93,90 71,19 0,88 93,28 71,19
Single male, no children 0,99 281,30 103,70 0,95 280,74 103,70
Single male, with children 1,00 139,38 69,13 0,94 138,80 69,13
Couple, no children 0,99 104,88 61,00 0,86 103,91 61,00
Couple, 1 child 0,99 83,29 47,14 0,80 82,06 47,14
Couple, 2 children 0,98 63,05 38,41 0,80 61,99 38,41
Couple, > 2 children 0,99 65,22 32,46 0,86 64,61 32,45
Household Type % positive gains Mean Median % positive gains Mean Median
All beneficiaries 0,99 0,46 0,21 0,86 0,46 0,21
Single female, no children 0,97 0,57 0,32 0,85 0,56 0,32
Single female, 1 child 0,99 0,23 0,14 0,72 0,23 0,14
Single female, 2 children 0,97 0,21 0,12 0,78 0,21 0,12
Single female, > 2 children 1,00 0,25 0,19 0,88 0,25 0,19
Single male, no children 0,99 0,75 0,32 0,95 0,74 0,32
Single male, with children 1,00 0,31 0,14 0,94 0,31 0,14
Couple, no children 0,99 0,28 0,15 0,86 0,28 0,15
Couple, 1 child 0,99 0,25 0,13 0,80 0,24 0,13
Couple, 2 children 0,98 0,19 0,11 0,80 0,19 0,11
Couple, > 2 children 0,99 0,20 0,11 0,86 0,20 0,11
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Table 2: Gains to Work by Household Type
Baseline simulation Without Intéressement
Monthly gains per adult equivalent
Total monthly gains
Baseline simulation Without Intéressement
Baseline simulation Without Intéressement
Monthly gains increase as a percentage of non-employment income
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. Gains are based on estimated wages and
hours potentially offered by employers. They are measured in Euros, and are computed as monthly flow from intertemporal wealth.
The equivalence scale uses weights: 1 for first adult, 0.7 for second adult and 0.5 for children.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -1,1853 -1,9807 -1,1348 -1,5262
(0,0952) (0,7038) (0,0947) (0,6849)
Log disposable income 0,9672 0,7974 0,3369 1,1208
(0,1619) (0,2169) (0,2381) (0,2155)
Direct effect of hours: 0,1877 0,0737
         Log hours worked (0,1643) (0,1604)
Direct effect of hours: 0,6484
         Full time dummy (>130 monthly hours) (0,1931)
Age -0,3886 -0,3963 -0,411
(0,0580) (0,0585) (0,0599)
Joint significance of disposable income 
and hours variable (Wald test) 37,66 47,12 55,62
Implied elasticity w.r.t. disposable income 1,17 0,96 0,39 1,25
Implied elasticity w.r.t. gross earnings 0,53 0,43 0,16 0,59
Number of Observations 820 820 820 820
Log Likelihood -424,25 -423,55 -418,55 -448,18
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -0,9537 -2,4075 -0,9245 -2,1995
(0,0782) (0,5088) (0,0783) (0,4975)
Log disposable income 0,8903 0,4386 0,3647 0,7331
(0,2160) (0,2629) (0,2967) (0,2534)
Direct effect of hours: 0,3499 0,2895
         Log hours worked (0,1206) (0,1176)
Direct effect of hours: 0,4854
         Full time dummy (>130 monthly hours) (0,1999)
Age -0,2817 -0,2972 -0,2712
(0,0520) (0,0523) (0,0545)
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old -0,4396 -0,4528 -0,4527 -0,4147
(0,1084) (0,1104) (0,1109) (0,1101)
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old 0,0237 0,0011 -0,0075 0,0548
(0,0577) (0,0731) (0,0784) (0,0582)
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0,031 0,0173 0,0212 -0,0693
(0,0486) (0,0548) (0,0559) (0,0476)
Joint significance of disposable income 
and hours variable (Wald test) 25,82 22,16 33,94
Implied elasticity w.r.t. disposable income 1,10 0,54 0,44 0,86
Implied elasticity w.r.t. gross earnings 0,36 0,17 0,14 0,31
Number of Observations 952 952 952 952
Log Likelihood -514,44 -509,82 -511,36 -526,38
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Table 4: Results of the Structural Employment Model (single persons)
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey limited to single persons. Simulated
maximum likelihood. See text for specification and normalizations.
Men
Women
Men Women
Observed employment rate 27,44% 27,42%
Simulated employment rate 27,21% 27,48%
Monthly value of net transfers 325 521
In-work disp inc. Increase -0,09% -0,31%
Simulated employment rate 27,18% 27,43%
Monthly value of net transfers 325 521
In-work disp inc. Increase 1,50% 5,80%
Simulated employment rate 27,63% 28,37%
Monthly value of net transfers 326 531
In-work disp inc. Increase 10,38% 8,37%
Simulated employment rate 29,59% 28,56%
Monthly value of net transfers 341 539
In-work disp inc. Increase 7,35% 4,57%
Simulated employment rate 28,86% 28,06%
Monthly value of net transfers 318 516
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Table 5: Policy impacts on labour supply
Source: Authors' estimates using the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey
limited to single persons. Results based on estimates presented in Table 4, col. (2). All
values are averages over the distribution of potential hours/wages (except "observed
employment rate") and over persons.
Minimum wage increase (+ 10%)
Baseline
No intéressement
Full intéressement
Prime pour l'emploi
Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Age 37,5687 8,3669 36,6742 8,4803
French Nationality 0,8573 0,3499 0,9199 0,2715
Paris Region 9,5549 25,0160 7,1355 22,0132
Education Category 1 (higher) 0,1527 0,3599 0,1123 0,3158
Education Category 2 (upper secondary) 0,1220 0,3274 0,1211 0,3264
Education Category 3 (lower secondary) 0,1865 0,3897 0,2416 0,4282
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0,3400 0,4739 0,3183 0,4660
Education Category 5 (primary) 0,1988 0,3992 0,2067 0,4051
Couple 0,2939 0,4557 0,2327 0,4227
Widower / Widow 0,0084 0,0915 0,0438 0,2047
Divorced 0,1044 0,3059 0,2539 0,4354
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old 0,0837 0,2957 0,1040 0,3229
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old 0,3354 0,8214 0,8172 1,0463
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0,1051 0,3945 0,2005 0,4940
Employed 0,3331 0,4715 0,3073 0,4615
CES contract if employed 0,2880 0,4534 0,3675 0,4827
Hourly wage if employed 5,6793 2,9676 5,3923 1,4491
Monthly hours if employed 129,8867 46,4072 104,3277 44,9366
Proportion at the minimum wage 0,6313 0,4830 0,7216 0,4487
Entitlement to Intéressement available 0,8918 0,3108 0,8652 0,3417
Full entitlement to Intéressement if available 0,6867 0,4640 0,7658 0,4237
Exhausted entitilement to Intéressement if available 0,2126 0,4093 0,1416 0,3488
Partial entitlement to Intéressement if available 0,1007 0,3010 0,0926 0,2899
# observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey.
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Men Women
Appendix table 1 : Descriptive Statistics, full sample
1303 1461
Mean s.e. Mean s.e.
Age 37,0793 8,2706 37,2857 8,4807
French Nationality 0,8902 0,3128 0,9275 0,2594
Paris Region 11,4329 26,9749 8,1145 23,3091
Education Category 1 (higher) 0,1756 0,3807 0,1271 0,3333
Education Category 2 (upper secondary) 0,1427 0,3500 0,1197 0,3248
Education Category 3 (lower secondary) 0,1890 0,3918 0,2227 0,4163
Education Category 4 (vocational) 0,3244 0,4684 0,3151 0,4648
Education Category 5 (primary) 0,1683 0,3744 0,2153 0,4113
Widower / Widow 0,0073 0,0853 0,0620 0,2412
Divorced 0,1561 0,3632 0,3288 0,4700
Number of Children: 0-2 Years Old 0,0012 0,0349 0,0546 0,2319
Number of Children: 3-14 Years Old 0,0280 0,2220 0,6271 0,8813
Number of Children: 15+ Years Old 0,0146 0,1390 0,2059 0,5020
Employed 0,2744 0,4465 0,2742 0,4463
CES contract if employed 0,2089 0,4074 0,2797 0,4497
Hourly wage if employed 6,0533 3,8597 5,4869 1,6563
Monthly hours if employed 137,4143 46,0791 115,5030 45,3367
Proportion at the minimum wage 0,5467 0,4989 0,6973 0,4603
Full entitlement to Intéressement if available 0,7012 0,4580 0,7290 0,4447
Exhausted entitilement to Intéressement if available 0,1951 0,3965 0,1628 0,3694
Partial entitlement to Intéressement if available 0,1037 0,3050 0,1082 0,3108
# observations
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Men Women
Appendix table 2 : Descriptive Statistics, single persons
Source: Authors' calculations based on the Devenir des personnes sorties du RMI survey. The sample is restricted to single
persons for which entitlement to Intéressement is known.
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Figure 1: Gross Labor Income versus Disposable Income
with and without Intéressement
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Figure 2a: Observed Monthly Earnings - Women
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Figure 2b: Observed Monthly Earnings - Men
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Figure 3a: Density of Monthly Hours Worked,
Observed and Estimated
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Figure 3b: Density of Log Hourly Wages
Above the Minimum Wage,
Observed and Estimated
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Figure 4a: Distribution of Gains to Employment 
per adult equivalent - Women
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Figure 4b: Distribution of Gains to Employment 
per adult equivalent - Women
by number of children
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Figure 4c: Distribution of Gains to Employment
per adult equivalent - Men
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Figure 5a: Selectivity - Hours, Female
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Figure 5b: Selectivity - Hours, Male
0
0,005
0,01
0,015
0,02
0,025
0 12 23 35 46 58 69 81 92 10
4
11
5
12
7
13
8
15
0
16
1
17
3
18
4
19
6
20
7
21
9
23
0
24
2
25
3
26
5
27
6
Hours
Observed
Simulated on employed
Simulated on non-employed
